Land & Water Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 2

Article 4

1974

Secondary Recovery of Oil & (and) Gas - The Rule of Positive
Dominion
Charles M. Aron

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Aron, Charles M. (1974) "Secondary Recovery of Oil & (and) Gas - The Rule of Positive Dominion," Land &
Water Law Review: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , pp. 457 - 484.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Aron: Secondary Recovery of Oil & (and) Gas - The Rule of Positive Domi

SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL & GAS -THE RULE OF POSITIVE DOMINION
The following article is based on three premises: first,
that efficient secondary recovery of petroleum reserves is a
matter of considerable economic and legal importance; second, that the present laws of oil and gas serve inadequately
to perform their requisite functions in regard to secondary
recovery; third, that analysis of sparse and confusing case
law, supplemented by analogy to related fields of property
law, reveals a practicable doctrine of property rights which
could serve as the basis for a legal construct satisfactory to
the secondary recovery operator, the owner of adjacent mineral rights, and the public interest.
The shortcomings of secondary-recovery-related law are
a lack of certainty due to inconsistent results in resolving
problems and an obsolescence of principle as measured by the
customary practices and technological realities of the petroleum industry. These shortcomings seem to be a result of
the way oil and gas law has evolved in delayed reaction to
the distinct technological advances in the industry. Unlike
the engineers, who have no doctrine of stare decisis, the
practitioners of the law have been unable to abruptly abandon their history, and as a result the law of oil and gas has
often embodied vestiges of obsolete technology. The object
of this article is to attempt a reconciliation of traditional
property rights with the practical advances represented by
secondary recovery operations.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SECONDARY RECOVERY OPERATIONS

The unfavorable ratio of increasing energy demands to
decreasing energy supplies in the United States has dramatically emphasized the importance of maximum exploitation of
petroleum resources.' The disproportionate share of world
energy consumption by this country2 further emphasizes the
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming

1. Crude oil and natural gas have contributed two-thirds of annual United
States energy consumption since 1957; most of the other one-third is attributable to coal. W. LOv.JOY & P. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL
CONSERVATION REGULATIONS 106 (1967).
2. The United States contains six percent of the world's population but consumes more than one-third of the world's total energy supply, and the rate
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particular need for maximum production in the domestic oil
and gas industry. Although the U.S. Geological Survey in
1965 estimated that 1 trillion barrels of crude oil might be
discovered in this country' (annual production in 1972 was
less than 3.5 billion barrels),' the critical factor in determining the amount of ultimate production is the efficiency of
recovery.' Exploration and future discovery can lead to
greater production also, but as a finite resource diminishes,
the cost of exploration increases in the face of fewer and
fewer significant finds. Increasing the efficiency of recovery, on the other hand, generally represents a more constant
cost/investment factor even as the market price increases,
hence a more attractive option to oil producers.'
The most efficient means of increasing ultimate production is the employment of secondary recovery operations.7
is expected to increase in the future. T. BAUER, NATURAL AND ENERGY
RESOURCES 91 (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968).
3. Id. at 101; cf. Torrey, Evaluation of United States Oil Resources as of
January 1, 1966, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION 3 (1966)

[herein-

after cited as Torrey], estimated the original content of reservoirs at 404
billion barrels.
4. Sweeney, The Fomation of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission Secondary

Recovery Committee, 14

INTERSTATE

OIL COMPACT

COMM'N

COMM.

BULL. 24 (1972).
5. As used here, the efficiency of recovery means the percentage of the original
oil in place which is actually removed from the ground.
The future availability of crude petroleum products will be pro6.
gressively more dependent upon the petroleum industry's ability to
improve the efficiency of recovery for existing oil accumulations by
the application of secondary recovery techniques. This situation is
the result of the inability to discover adequate amounts of economic
new reserves to replace the vast amounts of oil used annually.
Foreword, to G. LANGNES, J. ROBERTSON, & G. CHILINGER,
SECONDARY RECOVERY AND CARBONATE RESERVOIRS at xi (1972) [hereinafter
VanWingen,

cited as Langnes].
7. The term "secondary recovery" means any fluid injection into an oil reservoir for the purpose of augmenting naturally occurring pressure to increase the flow of oil to the well bore, thereby more completely recovering
the oil in place. In common usage the term "pressure maintenance" is
applied to fluid injection begun while primary recovery is still productive
whereas "secondary recovery" is applied to those operations begun after
primary methods have ceased producing. The two are technically indistinguishable and will herein be treated as one. H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL
& C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 11 (2d ed.

1964) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS, MAXWELL & MEYERS]. As used herein, the term also encompasses those methods known as "unconventional",
"improved fluid injection", or "tertiary" methods and including miscible
displacement, chemical additives in waterflooding, and thermal recovery
(in situ combustion, steam stimulation, steam drive). All of these methods
involve subsurface injection and can encounter similar legal problems.
Keeling, The Application of Advanced Recovery Techniques in the Midcontinent Area, 8 INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N BULL. 11 (1966).
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Early in the century, extraction by primary methods8 achieved
10-20 percent recovery of the oil originally in place. Current rates are less than 30 percent.' In contrast, conventional
secondary recovery methods normally improve recovery rates
to 30-60% of the original oil in place, and advanced methods
customarily achieve rates as high as 70-80%1o One author
offers the rule of thumb that the incremental recovery by
secondary methods represents a 100% improvement for crude
oil with specific gravity greater than 30' and a 50-100% improvement for gravities less than 3011 By 1965, 8,421 fluid
injection projects accounted for 36.4% of the nation's total
oil production. 2 At least 25 of the 31 oil producing states
have recovered fluid injection projects" and many states
report that a majority of their oil production results from
secondary recovery. "
In light of such figures, the clear public interest in conservation' and maximum recovery of oil and gas" must
8. Primary production is that which results from "the natural flow of oil
caused by the inherent pressure that originally existed in the pool." Reed v.
Texas Co., 22 Ill.App.2d 131, 159 N.E.2d 641, 642 (1959).
9. Based on 1966 figures of 404 billion barrels originally in place, 78 billion
barrels cumulative production and 32 billion barrels primary reserve. Torrey, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Elkins, The Role of Improved Secondary and Tertiary Methods in Enhancing USA Domestic Oil Reserves, 15 INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N
COMM. BULL. 12, 19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Elkins]. Note however,
that secondary recovery is not feasible in all fields. Waterfloods, for in11,000 feet and for
stance, are generally practical only at depths less than
°
crude oil of specific gravity in the range of 17*-46 .
LANGNES, supra note 6, at 2-3.
11. LANGNES, eupr note 6, at 51. The authors cite the experiences in two
Texas fields as examples. In one, the estimated primary recovery and
secondary recovery figures were 20 percent and 62 percent respectively;
in the other, the figures were 17 percent arnd 50 percent. Id. at 161.
12. Torrey, supra note 3, at 14.
13. U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INFO. CIR. No. 8455, POTENTIAL

OIL

RECOVERY BY

WATERFLOODING

RESERVOIRS

BEING

PRODUCED

BY PRIMARY METHODS (1970) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF MINES].
14. Arkansas, 47 percent; Indiana, 65 percent; Kansas, 60 percent (in 59
counties); Kentucky, 50-60 percent; Pennsylvania, 95 percent; Utah, 72
percent. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION SUMMARY OF SECONDARY
RECOVERY AND

PRESSURE MAINTENANCE

RULES

AND

REGULATIONS

IN

THE

Oklahoma, 50 percent; Texas, 30 percent; Illinois,
75 percent. Reports by States on Enhanced Recovery Activities, 14 INTERUNITED STATES (1969).

STATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N COMM. BULL. 26

(1972).

15. "It is now undeniable that a state may adopt reasonable regulations to
prevent economic and physical waste of natural gas." Cities Service Co. v.
Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950) ; accord, Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
16. Support for conservation as a basic premise is not unanimous. Opponents
of conservation point to continuing discovery of oil reserves, extraction
of oil from oil shale and coal, and the prospects for nuclear energy development as the basis for contending that conservation of oil and gas is un-
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favor the encouragement of secondary recovery methods. In
addition to the offer of economical incentive," a prerequisite
to effective encouragement of these methods is the development of an acceptable legal framework. While there is not
justification to favor the secondary recovery operator legally,
there is an absolute need to avoid unreasonable risk to him
of liability for his conduct and to afford him a degree of certainty in appraising his legal position. Whereas considerations of contract law, real property conveyancing, or tax law
might be foremost in the primary recovery legal context, in
regard to secondary operations the salient factor is the potential for tort liability to a neighboring mineral owner."5
An examination of the tort aspects of the secondary recovery
operation serves to identify the legal duties imputed to the
operator while defining the protectable property rights of
his neighbor. A workable legal framework must adequately
recognize these property rights and balance them against the
public policies favoring conservation through employment
of secondary recovery.
TECHNOLOGICAL PARAMETERS

19

Since the origin of oil and gas law, the petroleum industry has advanced technologically in several areas which
bear on the question of secondary-recovery-reated property
rights. The following brief description of four such areas
facilitates understanding of past court decisions and supports the proposition that novel legal solutions regarding
secondary recovery relationships are needed.
necessary and uneconomical. WILLIAMS, MAXWELL & MEYERS, supra note 7,
at 629.
17. Several states offer increased oil allowables for secondary projects. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN

THE UNITED STATES 95 (1964). Tax incentives for secondary recovery are
available under the provisions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 611 to 613.
18.

See generally Bowen, Secondary Reoovery Operations-Their Values and
Their Legal Problems, 13 OIL & GAS INST. (SW. LEGAL FDN.) 331 (1962)

[hereinafter cited as Bowen]; Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil
and Gas Industry II, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 253 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Keeton & Jones]; ones, Tort Liabilities in Secondary Recovery Operations,
6 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 639 (1961) ; Kennedy, Tort Liability in Water-

flood Operations, 5 ALBERTA L. REV. 52 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy]; McElroy Waterflooding of Oil Reservoirs, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 18
(1955); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 227 to 230
(1972).
19. For a comprehensive discussion of secondary recovery technology see
LANGNES, supra note 6.
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(1) Awareness of geological conditions within oil reservoirs. Through extensive research, petroleum engineers have
developed an understanding of important soil characteristics
such as the size of sand grains, porosity and permeability
within the reservoir, and interfacial forces between displacing and displaced fluids, plus structural conditions such as
thief zones (causing bypass of oil) and barriers to flow such
as faults." The increased predictability resulting from these
developments has encouraged the expansion of secondary
recovery operations.
(2) Refinement in measurement of recoverability. Improved accuracy in estimating total amounts of oil in place,
amounts recoverable from an entire reservoir, and amounts
attributable to tracts within a reservoir has had an important impact on the feasibility of measuring damages and of
working out proration formulas for unitization. Whereas
several decades ago the courts took notice of measuring the
exact quantity of oil under each tract,2 recent decisions indicate a willingness to rely heavily on expert analysis of reservoir potential."
(3) Understanding of the dynamics of oil and gas migration. Early decisions reflected an incomprehension of
the underground movement of the fugacious minerals.3 Today, the industry and the courts rely heavily on the predictability of the migration. 4 All major secondary recovery
projects and many voluntary agreements-such as lease line
injection projects where adjacent owners inject simultaneously near the lease line and realize reciprocal benefits from
the induced flow 2"-are based upon the accuracy of migration
predictions.
20. Id.
21. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801 (1907);
Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 A. 934 (1894).
22. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439
(10th Cir. 1971); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d
558 (1948).
23. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895); Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142
(1875).
24. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, supra note 22.
25. Two unreported Kansas cases regarding such an arrangement held that
there could be no liability for damages caused to wells by fluid injection
pursuant to the agreement. Poe v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., Civ. No. 2727
(D. Kan. 1964); Dawson v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., Civ. No. 2728 (D. Kan.
1964); as cited in Lawson, Recent Developments in Pooling and Unitization
23 OIL & GAS INST. (Sw. LEGAL FDN.) 145, 208 (1972).
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(4) Advanced methods of recovery. In addition to basic
gas injection and waterflooding, many other injection techniques have been developed. Sometimes called "tertiary"
when applied after secondary recovery has been exhausted,
the advanced methods include the following, employed either
singly or in combination: steam injections with a single bore
(called huff-puff), steam drive, combustion of the reservoir
contents, injection of solvents and additives, and injection of
a miscible slug driven by a less valuable fluid. The objective of these methods is to thin the oil by heating it or to alter
its permeability, thereby making it flow more easily and allowing it to be more thoroughly swept from the reservoir.
The cost of such methods ranges as high as $1.50 per barrel. "
Aside from this high cost, it is also noteworthy that secondary recovery projects are not automatically successful;
failures can result from engineering analysis errors related
to geologic factors, unforeseen drainage, unexpected bypassing of oil, or mechanical problems, or from economic difficulties resulting from insufficient capital, changes in prorations and allowables, or changes in prices.2 7
THE TORT LIABILITY PROBLEM IN
SECONDARY RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Outside the scope of this article are many topics which
may affect secondary recovery operations in an indirect way.
Conventional tort liability problems accompany many oil
recovery operations: the surface damage caused by destructive vibrations from blasting," by vibrations from drilling,2 9
by objects hurled onto neighboring property by explosives,"
or by the escape of deleterious substances ;"1 or the subsurface
26. Elkins, supra note 10, at 12-17. Cf. A preliminary cost estimate for a
typical 1968 water injection project was $264,800. U.S. BUREAU OF MINES,
supra note 13, at 27.
27. LANGNES, supra note 6, at 15.
28. States Exploration Co. v. Reynolds, 344 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1959), Pate v.
Western Geophysical Co. of America, 91 So.2d 431 (La. 1956). See generally, Smith, Rights and Liabilities on Subsurface Operations, 8 OIL &
GAS INST. (Sw. LEGAL FDN.) 1 (1957); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 2d 1372 (1951).
29. Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939).
30. Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31
(1937); Longtin v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 P. 699 (1904); Masterson,
The Legal Position of the Drilling Contractor, 1 OIL & GAS INST. (SW.
LEGAL FDN.) 183 (1949).
31. Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability in the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 T
.xAS
L.
REV. 1 (1956), and cases cited therein.
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trespass which attaches to the bottoming of a well across a
lease line ;2 or the trespass and ouster by an operator wrongfully under claim of right to do so." Other aspects of damage to mineral rights by geophysical trespass 4 are also excluded, though many of the property considerations involved
are applicable to secondary problems. Lessor-lessee relationships in secondary recovery situations are not specifically discussed."5
The problem which dominates the legal aspects of secondary recovery operations is the liability of the operator for
the subsurface invasion of neighboring property by injection
fluids. 8 Since any physical entry upon the property of
another-upon, above, or below the surface-constitutes a
trespass, 7 the tortious nature of the problem is patent. Due
to the unusual circumstances inherent in the recovery of fugacious mineral, to the unique damages in issue where minerals of great value but questionable recoverability are replaced
by substances of less value, and to the strong public policies
involved regarding conservation, the courts have differed
in defining the precise nature of the wrong. Decisions from
various jurisdictions have fitted the subsurface trespasses
into one of at least three categories of related theories of
liability: common law trespass; intrusion-based th ories;
and interference-based theories.3 " Emerging from this seeming diversity of tort theory, however, is an identifiable body
of commonly protected property rights. These common elements of the tort theories upheld by various courts must be
82. Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal.App.2d 587, 76
P.2d 167 (1938); Union Oil Co. of California v. Mutual Oil Co., 19 Cal.
App.2d 409, 65 P.2d 896 (1937); CAL. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 349 314
(West. 1954).
33. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862 (1927); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. 1925).
34. Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 444 (1959).
35. See generally Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery, 4 OKLA.
L. REV. 177 (1951).
36. See generally Hughes, Legal Problems of Water Flooding, Recycling, and
Other Secondary Operations, 9 OIL & GAS INST. (Sw. LEGAL FDN.) 105
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Hughes]; Walker, Problems Incident to Acquisition, Use and Disjosal of Repressuring Substances Used in Secondary
Recovery Operations, 6 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 273 (1961); Annot., 93

A.L.R.2d 457 (1964).
37. W. PROSSER, THE LAW op TORTS § 13, at 63 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Different categorization and discussion of the varied theories are found in
Bowen, supra note 18, Keeton & Jones, supra note 18; Kennedy, supra note
18; Lynch, Liability for Secondary Recovery Operations, 22 OIL & GAS INST.

(SW. LEGAL FDN.) 37 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Lynch].
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encompassed by any rule purporting to generalize secondaryrecovery related property rights.
Underlying the tort theory within a given jurisdiction is
the accepted theory of mineral ownership in oil and gas.
Generally, the oil-producing states treat the mineral interest
holder as either the owner of the oil as it exists in the ground
within his property boundaries-the ownership-in-place
theory 8 -or as the possessor of the right to reduce that oil
to his possession and ownership by removing it from the
ground-the non-ownership theory."0 For the purposes of
this discussion, the significant fact is that the extent to which
property is legally protected from invasion is not dependent
on the ownership theory held."' Rather, under either theory
the courts have tried to incorporate the traditional common
law property concept by which surface boundaries extend
vertically down to the center of the earth and up to the heavens.42 Also, within a given jurisdiction, the migratory nature of oil and gas-hence the designation as fugnacious minerals-has been accommodated by reliance to some extent
on the competing doctrines of the Rule of Capture and Correlative Rights.
Tl-e Rule of Capture4 1 states that the owner of a tract of
land acquires title to the oil or gas he produces from wells
on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated
from adjoining lands." The rule resulted from the early misconception of the physical nature of gas and oil in the ground.
Believing that oil flowed freely underground, the courts
analogized the mineral to a wild animal, reasoning that the
owner into whose property the oil flowed could claim title to
the mineral just as he could claim title to an animal which
39. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., supra note 22.
40. Miller v. Ridgley, 2 Ill.2d 223, 119 N.E.2d 759 (1954) ; Callahan v. Martin,
3 Cal.2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935).
41. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 203 to 203.4 at 26-47
(1972), recognizes two additional theories, qualified ownership and ownership of strata, and considers some states undecided. However, "[t]he liability vel non of the injector to the adjoining landowner does not appear
to turn upon the view held in the state as to the nature of the landowner's
interest in oil and gas." Id. §§ 204.5 at 53.
42. Shell Oil Co. Inc. v. Manley Oil Corp., 37 F.Supp. 289 (E.D.ll. 1941); 2
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 (5th ed. 1773).
43. Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, 6 OIL & GAS INST. (Swi
LEGAL FDN.) 257 (1955).
44. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., supra note 22.
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migrated there."' As a more advanced technology demonstrated that oil existed in reservoirs, that it was capable of
migration but was not freely flowing, the Rule of Capture
was modified by the developing doctrine of Correlative
Rights. 8
Correlative Rights is a generic term for those protections afforded the property interests of an owner of oil and
gas which is part of a common source of supply.47 Though
founded in common law, the specific protections afforded
mineral owners vary statutorily by jurisdiction; the most
significant correlative rights are (1) assurance of a right to
appropriate a just and equitable share in the proceeds from
a common source of supply," (2) protection from unreasonable drainage," and (3) protection from damage to the
common source of supply."0 These protections of individual
rights are actually conservation measures, on the premise
that protecting correlative rights provides a stabilizing influence on the petroleum industry and discourages wasteful
practices resulting when private owners race to satisfy their
own interests." Though these protections effectively restrict
traditional prerogatives of property owners, the basis for
limiting property rights to prevent waste 2 is firmly established as falling within the lawfully exercised state police
powers for the general welfare."3 The constitutionality of
conservation statutes thereby enacted was affirmed beyond
45. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A.
724 (1889); Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142 (1875).
46. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
47. In a literal sense, the right of the mineral owner to invoke the Rule of
Capture is a correlative right, but the term is used to describe the other
rights, generally acting in opposition to the Rule of Capture.
48. WYo. STAT. § 30-216(a) (3) (i) (1967); Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260,
196 N.W.2d 181 (1972).

49.

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

Title 52, § 87.1 (Cumin. Supp. 1971), and OKLA.

STAT.

Title 52 § 274 (1969).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-903 (1968), NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-905(3) (Cumm.
Supp. 1972). See generally Jones, Protection of Correlative Rights in
Wyoming, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 363 (1968), contending that legislative
protection of correlative rights is superfluous as it adds nothing to extant
common law rights.
ANN.

51.

INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS
IN THE UNITED STATES 202 (1964).

52. Waste includes not only physical waste but such specifically defined acts
as unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy, inefficient storage, and
reduction in ultimate recovery of a pool. WYO. STAT. § 30-216 (a) (Cumm.
Supp. 1973).
53. Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1934); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company v. People of the State of Illinois ex re4
Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S. 561 (1906) .
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dispute as early as 1900.4 Correlative rights are explicitly
or impliedly protected in the conservation statutes of 31
states."
The differing theories of tort liability for subsurface
invasion by secondary recovery injection fluids have evolved
within the limitations of these correlative rights and Rule
of Capture concepts which are unique to oil and gas law. The
following discussion is not intended as a complete examination of the theories, but rather as an analysis of their common elements. The differences between the theories are less
significant than the similarities when one attempts to define property rights in a manner compatible to the prevailing
laws of all the oil-producing jurisdictions.
COMMON LAW TRESPASS: Many subsurface incursions are common law trespass"6 actions since the intentional movement of a substance which results in the crossing
of a boundary underground is an invasion of another's property 7 just as clearly as is the crossing on the surface and
subsequent wrongful drilling of a well." Bottoming of a
slant well under a neighbor's land,"9 damage to structures by
seismic vibrations,"° and subsurface damage to fresh water
wells by disposal of salt water 1 have resulted in recoveries of
injunctions based on a trespass theory. Contrarily, a similar
situation of intrusion across lease lines by salt water disposal
was held not actionable, in spite of unauthorized use of land,
where there was no damage shown. 2 One writer has suggested
that all other theories are obfuscatory in secondary recovery
54. C.C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841
(1930); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Annot., 78 A.L.R.
834 (1932).
55. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming.
56. Any unauthorized entry onto the land of another. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 209 (5th ed. 1773).
57. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 13, at 69-70 (4th ed. 1971); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 (5th ed. 1773).
58. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. 1925).
59. Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 347, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
60. States Exploration Co. v. Reynolds, 344 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1959).
61. West Edmund Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
62. West Edmund Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226
P.2d 965 (1950). This result is contrary to common law trespass for which
at least nominal damages were available even without show of damage.
W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 13, at 66 (4th ed. 1971).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/4

10

Aron: Secondary Recovery of Oil & (and) Gas - The Rule of Positive Domi

1974

COMMENTS

situations and that tespass is the only appropriate remedy
for the invasion of another's land by injection fluids.6 3 There
is little support to be found for such a contention, however,
and the one case which can be read to rely on trespass theory
in a true secondary recovery situation contains elements of
several theories." Overall, the trespass theory is impractical
as a vehicle for solving secondary recovery injection problems. Because trespass is based on the tenet that the property owner is entitled to absolutely exclusive use and posession, there is an inherent contradiction with the realities of
oil and gas law embodied in the rules of capture and correlative rights. Additionally, as discussed infra, there is reason
to doubt another trespass theory tenet, the inviolability of
vertical boundaries.
Interference-Based Theories: Many cases have based
liability on the nature of the interference. Whether couched
in terms of nuisance, negligence per se, or strict liability,"5
these theories reflect the pivotal factor of the tort as the fact
of interference with the possession, use and enjoyment of
property.66 Though the general nature of the intruder's activity might be considered indirectly, his care or the specific
nature of his conduct is disregarded. 7 The intruders' intent
or lack of intent is not significant nor is his adherence to
recognized standards of care.6" In such cases there is liability
only for damages actually caused, not for the trespass itself.
The California statute providing for damages liability from
secondary recovery fluid invasions is directly in point, as the
actionable trespass is not enjoinable ;69 only the interference
is in issue, not the act of the intruder.
63. Kelley, Trespass in Secondary Recovery, 17 Sw. L.J. 591 (1963).
64. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
65. For a well-reasoned criticism of the failure by courts to properly distinguish between strict liability and negligence, see Green, Hazardous Oil
and Gas Operations: Tort Liability, 33 TExAs L. REv. 574 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Green].
66.
An action of nuisance is different from an action of trespass. An
action of trespass is the action which was brought where the body
or the land of a person had been invaded. An action of nuisance is
the action which was brought where there was no invasion of the
property of somebody else, but where the wrong of the defendant
consisted in so using his own land as to injure his neighbour's.
Kine v. Jolly, [1905] 1 Ch. 480, 487-88.
67. Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, supra note 29 (vibration damage).
68. Id.
69. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 731(c) (West. Supp. 1974).
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The possible basis for many of these cases is the famous
case of Rylands v. Fletcher"' which introduced the hazardous
activity concept and a form of strict liability for damages
caused thereby. In that case, defendant accumulated water
on his own property. The water eventually flooded plaintiff's mine. The defendant was held liable because the damages resuted from a non-natural use of the land, regardless
of the way in which he conducted himself." The decision is
based upon the protection of plaintiff's property rights and
the nature of the interference therewith, rather than upon
the conduct of the defendant.7 2
The modern cases tend to attach strict liability to private
nuisance resulting from activities regarded as abnormally
hazardous or merely abnormal. 8 Kansas imputes absolute
liability where pollution damage has been defined a nuisance,
and has applied the surface pollution statute to subsurface
invasion. 4 Even the Texas courts, which profess a negligence
approach, have applied strict liability to subsurface pollution
of fresh water wells where defendant violated a specific
7
administrative rule.
In all cases of strict liability, the type of harm threat76
ened and the class of persons protected are well marked out,
but in appication to a specific case, only the nature of the
interference is significant. One may infer from these cases
a strong policy against certain types of harm and a strong
judicial interest in granting to a property owner some form
of absolute protection from interference, but the equally
strong inference arises that such protection will be afforded
only where the rights involved are defined with requisite
certainty.
Intrusion-Based Theories: Although no cases of subsurface invasion by secondary recovery injection fluids are
70. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
71. Id.
72. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (H. & C. 1865). Lord Bramwell,
in his trial court dissent, subsequently upheld, characterizes the crux of
the plaintiff's case as follows: "[Y]ou have violated my right, you have
done what you had no right to do, and you have done me damage."
73. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962).
74. Polzin v. Nat'l Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 175 Kan. 531, 266 P.2d 293 (1954).
75. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1956).
76. W. PRossu, THE LAW OF TORTS § 79, at 517-519 (4th ed. 1971).
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directly in point,"7 many analogous cases have relied on some

variation of the theories of negligence or fault, finding liability on the basis of the manner in which the intruder has
carred on the activity which proximately caused the damage.
Liability is contingent on the fault of the intruder in his
non-conformance with a definable standard of due care, 7
measurable by customary industry practice and administrative regulations. Though the cause of action would be based
on the nature of the intruder's act, difficulty could be encountered in providing damages, proximate cause, and foreseeability of the harm. Articles cited above (note 78) amplify
the ramifications of applying a negligence/fault theory.
Negligence was proffered as the only acceptable theory
in a Texas opinion, Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.

(intrusion

by salt water from flooded ponds), but the opinion is confusing.8 ' Another Texas case, involving surface damage by
intruding oil, disallowed liability in the absence of a show of
negligence. 2 The Texas case most similar to a secondary
recovery situation is Commanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pac.
Coal & Oil Co., involving damage to neighboring wells resulting from plaintiff's use of explosives in shooting his own
oil well. The court based liability on a finding of negligence
in the use of too much nitroglycerine." Also, in Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., liability was founded on negligence in
drilling procedure, causing a well to blow out and crater,
damaging neighboring wells. 4
Several older cases involving the flooding of a neighbor's mines offer a close analogy to fluid injection invasions.
In these cases the courts relied on fault or negligence in
holding that one is not accountable for permitting water to
77. One gas re-cycling case does include dicta to the effect that negligence
would have to have been shown in order to find liability. Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946).
78. For a comprehensive discussion of tort theories in secondary recovery and
argument supporting a negligence/fault theory as the proper approach,
see Lynch, supra note 38, and Bowen, supra note 18.
79. W. PROSSER, THm LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
80. 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
81. See Green, supra note 65.
82. Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1931).
83. 298 S.W. 554 (Tex. 1927).
84. The analogy to the secondary recovery situation is admittedly strained,
but the opinion of the court indicates a probable willingness to extend the
holding to damage caused by fluid injection.
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flow naturally from his own property into a neighbor's mine,
but one is liable for non-conformance to standards of ordinary care if he contributes to the flow.85
The theory of liability based on negligence in subsurface
invasions is an attractive one. It takes into account the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the secondary recovery
operation. Although the theory does not serve to clarify
relevant property rights of the mineral owners, it does
indicate this essential consideration. Only by so taking into
account the nature of an intruder's act can a theory of liability provide the necessary freedom of operation essential
to the encouragement of secondary recovery operations.
THE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL,
UNITIZATION STATUTES, & PUBLIC POLICY

One aspect of the secondary recovery legal scheme which

arises in many cases is the effect of approval by the appropriate state administrative agency."6 In most states the commission having authority to approve an injection program
must base its decision on findings that correlative rights
will be protected, that waste will be prevented, and that ultimate recovery will be increased.8" The doctrines of primary
jurisdiction"8 and collateral estoppel89 afford finality to an
administrative determination of matters within the authority
of the commission, but the issue of tort liability has not been
determined by a commission even when it finds that correlative rights will be protected."
The decided cases have given varied weight to agency
approval. Texas courts in one case held that where valid
85. Spadra Creek Coal Co. v. Eureka Anthracite Coal Co., 104 Ark. 359, 148
S.W. 644 (1912); Horner v. Watson,, 79 Pa. 242 (1875).
86. See generally Driscoll, Secondary Recovery of Oil and Gas: Significance
of Agency Approval, 13 KANSAS L. REV. 481 (1965).
87. WYO. STAT. §§ 30-219 & 30-222 (Cumm. Supp. 1973).
88. 2 AMd. JUR. 2d Administrative Law §§ 788-797 (1962). See Convisser,
Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations,65 YALE L.J. 315
(1955).
89. Where an issue has actually been adjudicated by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties and their privies.
Unlike other re8 judicata effects, the doctrine does not apply to which only
might have been adjudicated but were not. See 46 AM. Jun. 2d JUDGMENTS
§ 415 et seq. (1969).
90. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
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agency approval of a reasonable injection program has been
obtained, a trespass does not occur when injection fluids
move across lease lines and therefore the operation is not
enjoinable.9 One trial court decision, subsequently reversed,
found a similar invasion to constitute a trespass, but considered commission approval to render it non-enjoinable
nonetheless. 2 One writer has suggested that agency approval
should immunize the operator from all liability for operations pursuant to the plan." In one case a federal court
awarded damages where a Kansas court had disallowed injunction for the same invasion. 4 Courts have denied injunction,9" and in one case damages, 6 simply because the complaining party had previously refused participation in an
approved program.
The precedential value of these cases is not clear. Because most of them deal with inconclusive evidence of damages, past or prospective, and because the question of actual
compliance with agency directive has not been clearly decided,
a narrow reading of any one of the cases would be indicated.
The complexity of secondary recovery operations and relationships is such that these prior cases could then be distinguished from a disputed issue.
Although prior, lawful agency approval appears to provide grounds for denial of injunctive relief, the ultimate tort
liability issue is not capable of resolution by an administrative body acting before the fact. In the absence of a reassessment of property rights such as is proposed below, the
best approach is that provided by statute in California. Injunction is specifically denied for subsurface invasion from
reasonable secondary recovery operations, and damages liability is mitigated by the amount of the benefits conferred
on the plaintiff by the operation. 7
91.
92.
93.
94.

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., supra note 90.
Hughes, supra note 36.
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 L.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963); Jackson v.
State Corporation Commission, 186 Kan. 6, 348 P.2d 613 (1960).
95. Reed v. Texas Co., 22 IlLApp.2d 131, 159 N.E. 2d 641 (1959).
96. Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, supra note 77.
97. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 731 (c) (West. Supp. 1961). California also provides statutory exemption for damages caused from operations conducted
without negligence pursuant to an approved project. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 3320.5 (West. 1972).
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Paralleling the effect of administrative approval in specific cases is the overall impact of unitization statutes 8 and
express public policy favoring secondary recovery of oil and
gas. 9 These measures provide evidence of at least legislative
sentiment and at most legislative mandate that in a conflict
between the wishes of a private mineral owner and the interests of society in efficient petroleum recovery, the mineral
owner must yield."' Though an owner overruled by societal
policy must always receive compensation for minerals removed, it is important to realize that the individual owner
has interests other than immediate monetary gain. For
example, an owner might wish to postpone development on
the basis of personal reasons, tax considerations, or his own
assessment-hardly unreasonable-that his resources will be
worth more in the future. One author has identified four
other major reasons for opposition to the principle of unitization:
(1)

Unitization is viewed as contrary to the free enterprise ethic and as being socialistic.

(2) It is felt that the administrative responsibility is
placed in the hands of major operators who are held
in distrust by independents skeptical of the prospects
for impartiality.
(3) It is doubted that officials are capable of apportioning fairly even if acting in good faith.
(4) A conservative attitude favors the status quo. There
is the feeling that the industry is doing just fine
without unitization. 10 1
98. Twenty-five states have adopted some form of unitizations statute: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiann, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota. Tennessee,
Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 104 § 89 (Supp. 1973); NE. REV. STAT. § 57-901 (1968);
Reed v. Texas Co. supra note 95.
100. Various compulsory unitization statutes permit the inclusion of between
5 percent and 37 percent of the interest owners in spite of their protests.
E.g, WYo. STAT. § 30-222(b) (Curn. Supp. 1973), requiring the approval
of at least 80 percent of the interest owners in order to compel the unitization.
101. L. LovE.O & P. HOMAN, EcoNoMIc ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATioN 106 (1967).
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Notwithstanding these opposing views, the compelling
facts favor continued encouragement of secondary recovery
operations and unitizations. Any re-evaluation of secondaryrecovery-related property rights must take into account this
unrelenting trend.
THE RULE OF

PosITIvE DOMINION..

2

The problems associated with secondary recovery operations have received considerable attention from writers in
the field. Discussed infra are five proposals that have been
offered as solutions to the legal complications involved; none,
however, have been well received by the courts. The following
suggested rule proposes a different approach by offering a
re-definition of fundamental property rights in oil and gas.
As will be demonstrated by application to recent cases, the
rule provides not only the abstract certainty essential to the
encouragement of secondary recovery operations, but also
the guidelines for practical decision-making in the courts.
It is suggested that the Rule of Positive Dominion (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) encompasses the important
and constructive features of the various tort theories discussed previously, and at the same time it follows logically
upon the modern concepts of property ownership.
STATEMENT OF THE

RULE

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN OIL AND GAS VEST
ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE INTEREST
HOLDER ESTABLISHES POSITIVE DOMINION
OVER THE MINERALS IN THE GROUND.
POSITIVE DOMINION IS EFFECTEDWHEN (1)
PHYSICAL INFLUENCE HAS BEEN EXERTED
OVER THE PARTICULAR STRATUM CONTAINING
THE MINERALS, AND (2) THE PRESENT CAPACITY TO ACHIEVE PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
MINERALS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.
102.

"Dominion, when full, is defined to be the right in a thing from which
arises the power of disposition and the right of claiming it from others."
Baker v. Westcott, 73 Tex. 129, 11 S.W. 157, 159 (1889). "Dominion implies
the right to the property to the exclusion of others." 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 1 (5th ed. 1773).
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The application of the Rule of Positive Dominion is uncomplicated. When an individual, N, acquires oil and gas
interests in Blackacre, he owns the exclusive right to drill
into fugacious substances located within the vertical boundaries of the land. When he drills a well, N establishes positive dominion over oil or gas formations reached by the well
bore to the extent he is capable of recovering the oil or gas,
That is, mere intrusion effects instantaneous positive dominion over oil and gas recoverable by primary methods- it is
immediately recoverable. That portion of the oil and gas
recoverable only by secondary recovery methods does not
come within N's positive domain until such methods are
initiated, rendering the mineral presently recoverable. If
instead N's well contacts fluids forced under Blackaere by
the injection from an adjacent secondary recovery operator,
0, N has established positive dominion over only what he
finds, be it gas, oil, salt water, or whatever. Should N's well
contact oil which is being pressured by O's injection project,
N establishes dominion over whatever oil will flow from his
well, source of pressure notwithstanding, because this oil is
now immediately recoverable by N. If on the other hand,
where N has not drilled a well and O's project sweeps the
oil out from under Blackacre, N has suffered damnum absque
injwria because he did not have a vested interest in the oil
swept away. There has been no interference with or conversion of minerals over which N exercises positive dominion.
It is important to note that the proposed rule does not in
any way lessen N's rights against a slant driller. Only the
legal interest holder possesses the right to physically enter
or drill within the vertical boundaries of Blackacre. The oil
and gas beneath the surface are not fair game for the first
taker.
As regards N's subsurface boundaries and the extent of
his potential subsurface rights, the rule is fair and unambiguous. In keeping with N's property rights in the air above
Blackacre, which exist only to the extent he can occupy or use

the space,' so also do his subsurface rights exist only to the
extent he exercises positive dominion over the property. Both
103. In Re Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. Ltd., 507 P.2d 755 (Hawaii 1973).
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above and below the surface, N has the right to use the
property at any level and to the very edge of his boundaries.
He may drill a well, thereby claiming subsurface strata, or
he may buid a skyscraper over every square inch of the land.
But in either case, he cannot absolutely exclude invasion
into a level which he is not capable of using reasonably.
Violation of N's rights by another are compensable to the
extent of diminution in value of those minerals over which
N exercised dominion.
THE AIRSPACE ANALOGY

The only aspect of the rule which clearly departs from
traditional property rights concepts is the disregard of the
sanctity of vertical boundaries. This departure is not unprecedented.
The non-adherence to strict vertical property boundaries
first emerged in regard to ownership of the space above the
surface. The analogy of above-surface boundaries to subsurface boundaries follows quite naturally from the fact
that the extension of surface boundaries in both directions
traditionally emanated from the same common law maxim:
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infero. 1"
The problem of legally protecting indefinite vertical
boundaries was recognized early in the development of the
common law, but at that time the issue was raised only rheWhen applied to practical situations, the doctorically.'
trine was modified by pragmatic construction. For example,
in a case involving a wire crossing over the land of another,
a New York court found that land ownership extended above
the land only within limitations, which in that case meant
"within the bounds of any structure yet erected by man."' 0 6
104. "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 453 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). "Land hath also, in its
legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards."
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 (5th ed. 1773).
105. "You must prove that the projection is a trespass; it may be a very nice
question.-I recollect a case, where I held that firing a gun loaded with shot
into a field was a breaking of the close .... Would a trespass lie for passing through the air in a balloon over the land of another?" Pickering v.
Rudd, 1 Starkie 56, 171 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (1815).
106. Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906).
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With the advent of frequent air travel, the courts had little
difficulty in further limiting the effect of the maxim. They
simply refused to interpret it literally."' Various cases
limited the maxim in specific terms: to an onwer's dominant
right of occupancy of the airspace above his land for purposes incident to the use and enjoyment of the surface;01s
to a right in the space within which the surface owner has a
reasonable possibility of possession ;.. or, most recently, to
ownership of as much sapce above his ground a he can occupy or use in connection with the land. 1 ' In all of these
cases, invasion of space outside the reasonable limit was not
actionable. The U.S. Supreme Court held as early as 1946
that the doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world, and
that recognition of any such claim is contrary to the public
interest."'
The application of the airspace analogy to subsurface
property boundaries took place soon after the air travel
cases first reached the courts. In holding that a sewer procured by condemnation at a depth greater than 150 feet was
not an encumbrance (in breach of a deed covenant), a New
York court stated the analogy in the following terms:
It therefore appears that the old theory that the
title of an owner of real property extends indefinitely upward and downward is no longer an accepted
principal of law in its entirety. Title above the
surface of the ground is now limited to the extent
to which the owner of the soil may reasonably make
use thereof.
By analogy, the title of an owner of the soil
not be extended to a depth beyond which the owner
may not reasonably make use thereof." 2
A concept similar to the proposed Rule of Positive
Dominion was mentioned in a well-reasoned dissent in the
107. See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R. 316 (1930); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 333 (1933);
Annot., 99 A.L.R. 173 (1935) and cases cited therein.
108. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
109. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta. 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
110. In Re Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. Ltd., supra note 103.
111. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
112. Boehringer v. Montalto, 142 Misc. 560; 254 N.Y.S. 276, 278 (1931).
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1929 Kentucky case of Edward v. Sims.'1 8 In that case, the
court allowed plaintiff to force the closing of defendant's
tourist attraction, a scenic cavern, pending determination
of whether the cavern extended under plaintiff's property.
Objecting to this recognition of property rights in one who
has no entrance to the cave many feet below the surface,
Justice Logan stated the following in his lengthy dissent:
. . . The true principle should be announced to
the effect that a man who owns the surface, without
reservation, owns not only the land itself, but everything upon, above, or under it which he may use for
his profit or pleasure, and which he may subject to
his dominion and control. But further than this
his ownership cannot extend. It should not be held
that he owns that which he cannot use and which is
of no benefit to him, and which may be of benefit
to others.
... Therefore, let it be written that a man who
owns land does, in truth and in fact, own everything
from zenith to nadir, but only for the use that he
can make of it for his profit or pleasure. He owns
nothing which he cannot subject to his dominion.'1 4
TRE RULE APPLiED

The practical legal problems accompanying the crossing
of lease lines by injection fluid attach to a limited number
of situations; two relatively recent cases illustrate the most
likely occurrences leading to legal conflict. It is in light of
these and other actual cases that one must assess the Rule of
Positive Dominion and such other proposals a have been
offered a comprehensive approaches to the secondary recovery
legal dilemma.
The secondary recovery legal conflict usually involves
a variation on one of three hypothetical situations involving
0, the secondary recovery operator, and N, the owner of
neighboring mineral estates bounding O's project:
113. 282 Ky. 791, 24 S.W.2d 619 (1929).
114. Id. at 622.
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Case #1: N is actively producing oil from his own wells.
O's injection fluid destroys the productivity of N's wells.
A significant variable in this situation is the question of
whether N is in primary or secondary recovery.
Case #2: N has no active recovery operations. O's injection fluid sweeps the oil out from under N's property.
Case #3: N objects to the intrusion by O's injection
fluid, but recovers from his own wells oil unrecoverable except
for the pressure provided by O's project.
The 1971 Oklahoma case of Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Joiner City Unit. 5 is illustrative of situation
#1. In Greyhound, plaintiff N was an interest owner in two
oil and gas leases and two wells alleged to have been damaged
permanenty by injection fluid from the unitized waterflood
project of defendant, 0. O's project was a voluntary unitization approved by the Corporation Commission; N had refused to be included in the unit. The invading fluid was injected a mile from the lease boundary and the flood had
been in progress for nearly a year prior to the damage to N.
Prior to the interference, N's wells had been producing by
primary methods.
The court awarded N approximately $530,000 on the basis
of four main findings affirmed on appeal: (1) Involvement
by N in the commission hearings, and his subsequent acts in
keeping himself appraised of the flood's progress did not
constitute assumption of the risk or consent to the intrusion;
(2) The fluid invasion constitutes a common law private
nuisance as modified by the Oklahoma constitution's prohibition of depriving an individual of property without compensation; (3) The measure of damages is the diminution of
recoverable reserves; (4) The Corporation Commission does
not have jurisdiction over an action for damages, notwithstanding that the unit operation had been approved." 6
Hypothetically applying the Rule of Positive Dominion
to the Greyhound case, the results are the same. N's two
115. 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971).
116. Id.
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wells established positive dominion over his portion of the
reservoir. Interference with N's vested interest was actionable, the damages measurable by the amount of established
potential recovery denied to N. The only debatable question
of fact would be the exact amount of presently recoverable
oil. Whether presently recoverable oil would include potential secondary recovery would be a fact question to be contingent to N's showing of feasibility and intent to conduct
such operations.
The significance of the Rule is demonstrated by this
application not because of the result, but because of the reasoning upon which the result is based. By clarifying the relationship of the parties the rule illustrates the necessary
limit beyond which public policy considerations regarding
secondary recovery cannot be extended without express statutory foundation. The result in Greyhound serves merely
as a case in point. More importantly, the Rule in this application defines clearly the various interests involved, highlighting the considerations upon which legislation could and
should be based. In the absence of compulsory unitization,
the Rule does permit a single operator to impede the progress of a large waterflood project, but only because that
operator has clearly established his right to do so. This clarification of interests serves the cause of unitization better
than does any polemical arguments favoring the steamroller
approach to public policy considerations. Unlike the atmosphere of uncertainty now prevalent, the situation under the
Rule would be one in which the rights and obligations of the
parties would be clearly delineated. It is only within such
parameters that intelligent legislation and consistent court
actions are forthcoming.
The 1969 Nebraska case of Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil
Corp.1 ' is illustrative of problem #2. N owned the oil and
gas lease in land adjoining O's waterflood project. 0's operation was a voluntary unitization with commission approval
which N had refused to join. (The case arose prior to the
passage of Nebraska's compulsory unitization statute.) O's
injection fluid swept the oil from under N's land. N had not
117. 184 Neb. 884, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969).
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drilled a well. The oil under his land was not economically
recoverable by primary methods, but if N had drilled a well
prior to the intrusion he could have recovered oil being pressured by O's waterflood. The trial court awarded recovery
for the full amount of the oil displaced, basing the judgment
on a common law trespass theory. The Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed, holding that N could not be permitted to
profit from his refusal to join in a unitization project. Rather
than deny any recovery, however, the court inexplicably
awarded recovery up to the amount of profit N would have
realized had he drilled his own well, even though that profit
would have been attributable to O's waterflood." 8 N recovered what he could have realized from primary and secondary recovery, though he conducted no drilling or injection.
The enigmatic holding of the court seemed to reflect an attempt to honor simultaneously (1) the express Nebraska
policy favoring secondary recovery, (2) the commission approval of the voluntary project, (3) the correlative rights of
N, and (4) N's fundamental property rights. The inconclusive decision is directly attributable to the contradictions inherent in the four factors. This was a case crying out for a
doctrine of realistically defined property rights.
As was the case in Greyhouud, the application of the
Rule to the Baumgartner case presents no difficulty. N
would recover nothing. At no time did N establish positive
dominion over any oil. He suffered damnum absque injuria
if he suffered at all.
The true value of the Rule in this situation derives not
from the ease of application, but from the contribution it
would have made to the pre-injection understanding of the
legal situation by all parties involved. N would have understood his risk in refusing to join the unit without taking action to drill on his lease. 0, for his part, could have proceeded
with some assurance regarding his rights. Whereas the court
decision provides little guidance for mineral owners in slightly
different situations, the result under the Rule would have
provided as much certainty as can be found anywhere in
the law.
118. Id.
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The application of the Rule to situation #3 is amply
illustrated by varying slightly the facts in Baumgarnter. Had
N in fact drilled a well prior to the invasion by the injection
fluid, #3 would have resulted: N would have recovered oil
pressured by O's flood. The result under the Rule would
then agree with what the court held in Baungartner. N
having established positive dominion over the oil recoverable
by secondary methods-a present capacity to recover though
a result of O's injection-he would have been entitled to the
value of that amount of oil. Whatever he physically recovered would then be offset against this total value in determining O's liability, so that in most such situations there would
probably be no net damages. Regardless of the specific
results, the recognition of the Rule would have enabled both
N and 0 to understand their relative rights and obligations
as soon as N drilled his well.
In applying the Rule to these situations, one important
aspect of secondary recovery legal problems that is not fully
resolved is the question presented by suits for injunction
against injection projects. Under prevailing law, many courts
have denied injunctive relief because a project was reasonable
and had been approved by the appropriate administrative
authority."' Although these decisions are inextricably bound
up with procedural doctrines relating to administrative law
and construction of statutory provisions relating to the extent of commission authority,1 2 the ultimate decision must
be largely dependent on the court's definition of plaintiff's
subsurface property rights. As a result, adherence to the
Rule of Positive Dominion could clarify such decisions, con119. E.g., Jackson v. Corporation Commission, supra note 94; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, supra note 91.
120. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 6upra note 94.
A fluid injection damage situation not mentioned in the three hypothetical
cases involves the significance of agency approval: 0 conducts a fluid
injection operation either without approval or in a negligent manner, and
the total potential recovery of the reservoir is diminished. Under the
Rule, mineral owners in other portions of the reservoir have not been
damaged unless they have previously established positive dominion. As
discussed in the text, supra at 15 & 16, exclusive authority over injection
operations has been granted to administrative agencies which must find
that waste will be prevented and correlative rights protected before an
operation is approved. Therefore, the negligent or non-approved operator
is properly answerable to the state rather than to other mineral owners
whose claim of damage has not been clearly established. Statutory provisions for criminal or state civil penalties would seem to be the appropriate
remedy in such situations.
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tribufing significantly to consistency and the elimination of
uncertainty in this type of action. The most satisfactory result, irrespective of property theory upheld, would be the
statutory denial of injunction against approved projects as
now prevails in California.'
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAIs

The proposed rule is not the first attempt to simplify
the fluid injection dilemma. At least five writers have responded to the compelling need for clarity in this confused
area. The following discussion undoubtedly oversimplifies
each proposal, but the general approach of each one should be
understandable when considered in the context of the situations discussed heretofore.
(1) Williams and Meyers have suggested that a "negative rule of capture" has developed, providing that the migration of secondary recovery injection fluids into another's
lease should be treated as a corollary to the Rule of Capture,
hence not actionable.' 2 2 The idea has been mentioned in several decisions, 2 ' but it has not been adopted in any jurisdiction. This proposal would seem to be unsatisfactory in
application to the hypothetical situation #1 discussed supra,
where pre-existing neighboring wells are damaged since one
would not expect the allowing of such damage with impunity.
The proposal is best applied in situations such as #2 or in
gas storage and recycling situations.
(2) Several writers 2 have proposed that the operator
of an approved injection project be without liability if he
conducts the operation in accordance with the accepted plan.
This proposal has been discussed primarily in regard to
lessee-lessor relationships, where it has considerable merit, and
further extension of the concept is appealing. The one overriding objection is the procedural inability of an administrative agency to fairly determine the issue of tort liability in
121. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 731(c) (West Supp. 1961).
122. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 204.5, 222 (1972).
123. E.g., Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra note 116; Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Mauziel, supra note 91.
124. E.g., Hughes, supra note 36.
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evaluating the proposed project prior to the fact. The courts
are unlikely to extend the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
to such extremes. To do so would be to acquiesce in a usurpation of their authority, and the prevailing statutes from which
the commissions derive their authority do not support such
a result.
(3) A comprehensive proposal has been put forth by
Dean Kuntz in his revision of Thornton' and in a 1964
article Recent Developnents in Oil and Gas Law." 6 Appraising the problem from the standpoint of correlative rights,
he suggests that two such rights have emerged in regard to
secondary recovery: (a) The right to fair opportunity to
conduct secondary recovery operations, and (b) the right to
participate in secondary operations conducted by another.
Taken together, these two correlative rights would lead to a
fully satisfactory resolution of injection fluid problems. The
only objection to this approach is that the judicial interpretations required in its application are unlikely to be more
clear or consistent than those which have been decided up to
now. In essence, the proposed theory accomplishes indirectly
what the Rule of Positive Dominion does directly. Such a
fundamental alteration of property rights should not be approached tangentially, but should instead be accomplished in
an unequivocal way in order to avoid divergent interpretation and results.
(4) A provocative comment in an article by Dean Keeton
and Mr. Lee Jones alludes to another comprehensive solution. 7 Reserving discussion of the suggestion for a subsequent article, the authors rely on the airspace analogy, supra,
and propose that the reasonableness of the operator's conduct, the public and private interests involved, and the neighbor's prospective use of a subsurface reservoir should all
be considered in determining a proper theory. The precise
approach is not discussed, so the manner in which the solution would be articulated and the property or tort relationships thereby affected is a matter of speculation.
125. 1 E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS §§ 4.8(c) and (d)
126. 10 PRAcTIcAL LAwYER 65 (1964).
127. Keeton & Jones, 8upra note 18, at 270.

(Supp. 1971).
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(5) In an article covering all facets of the problem,"'8
Mr. Thomas W. Lynch argues forcefully that the universal
acceptance of the theory of fault as the single approach
would accomplish the desired purpose. He has included a
proposed standard of care (based upon the evidentiary condition upon which the commission based its approval) and
a proper measure of damages (the difference between plaintiffs net gains, with and without secondary recovery), so the
theory is complete in all respects. As was mentioned earlier,
the major drawback to the fault-only approach to these
problems is its failure to clarify the rights of the neighboring
landowner. In addition, the fact that the application depends
on an authoritative determination of whether the operator
has adhered to an approved plan and whether his acts fall
within the prescribed standard of care would result in too
many cases in which litigation is unavoidable.
In summary, the proposals offered to de-mystify the
problem of secondary recovery fluid invasions have not proved
satisfactory. Each proposal either fails to deal with some
facet of the problem or provides a solution lacking the desirable clarity and certainty of result in its application.
CONCLUSION

Secondary recovery of oil and gas is of increasing legal
and economic importance. Previously accepted tort theories
provide an inadequate legal construct to encourage such operations and to balance fairly the competing interests of operator, neighboring mineral leaseholder, and public policy.
Solutions which have been proposed have provided reasonable
approaches to various aspects of the situation, but the proposals have offered fragmentary solutions or theories unacceptable to the courts. It is suggested that the only practical
solution is a re-evaluation of fundamental property rights in
oil and gas such as is here offered by the Rule of Positive
Dominion.
CHARLES M. AEON

128. Lynch, supra note 38.
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